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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last fifteen years, courts and rule makers have increasingly 
focused on the procedures surrounding the class certification hearing.
1
  This 
increased focus has stemmed from a growing realization that the settlement 
pressures that come from certification of a nationwide class action are so 
strong that certification often effectively ends the litigation.
2
  Because 
certification is so key to the outcome of the suit,
3
 certification hearings 
have begun to look more and more like mini-trials, sometimes requiring the 
submission of affidavits, competing expert testimony, and the introduction 
of documents.
4
 
As this evolution has occurred, questions have naturally begun to arise 
about the extent to which the procedural rules governing normal trials 
apply to these so-called mini-trials.  In 2013, the Supreme Court in 
Comcast Corporation v. Behrend granted certiorari over one such question: 
Must a court resolve objections to the admissibility of expert testimony at 
the certification hearing, when that evidence is used to show that Rule 23’s 
requirements for certification are met?
5
 
This procedure, commonly known as a Daubert ruling, requires the 
judge to examine whether proffered expert testimony is sufficiently reliable 
and probative as to be admissible, given a number of factors.
6
  The 
Comcast Court, however, did not actually decide whether courts must make 
Daubert rulings, because the Petitioners had failed to raise the issue below.
7
  
It thus remains an open issue in class certification litigation.  The issue is 
an important one because expert witness testimony is routinely used to 
show that class certification is proper.
8
 
This Comment examines the Daubert issue through the lens of the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and 
Comcast, and concludes that courts must now resolve Daubert objections at 
the class certification stage.  Part I of this comment gives a brief history of 
the procedures surrounding class certification, discussing the Court’s 
 
 1.  See infra Part III.a. 
 2.  See infra Part III.a. 
        3.    See infra Part III.a. 
 4.  See Steven F. Grifith, Certification Hearings and Decisions, in A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 89, 90-91 (Marcy Hogan Greer ed., 2010) (discussing the 
necessity and procedure of an evidentiary hearing in deciding class certification); WILLIAM 
B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 12 (5th ed. 2013) (stating that while district 
courts have discretion as to whether to hold an evidentiary hearing in deciding class 
certification, most courts chose to hold such a hearing). 
 5.  133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431 n.4 (2013). 
 6.  See infra Part II.a. 
 7.  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431 n.4 (2013). 
 8.  Rubenstein, supra note 4,  at 126-138. 
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seemingly permissive approach in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin and the  
clarification of its approach in General Telephone Company v. Falcon.  
Part II examines the requirements of Daubert expert witness certification 
and explains how pre-Wal-Mart and Comcast courts dealt with these 
requirements at class certification.  Part III examines the Court’s decisions 
in Wal-Mart and Comcast and shows how these cases solidified a 
heightened level of scrutiny for class certification.  Part IV argues that 
under Wal-Mart and Comcast, Courts must conclusively rule on Daubert at 
class certification. 
I. EISEN AND FALCON: WHAT TO DO WITH OVERLAPPING MERITS 
ISSUES. 
In order to certify a class action, a district court must find that both the 
elements of Rule 23(a)
9
 and all the requirements of one of the categories of 
class actions in Rule 23(b) are met.
10
  The court often determines whether 
these requirements have been met through a certification hearing where 
testimony and evidence are presented.
11
  Before the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wal-Mart, courts disagreed about the extent to which they were 
permitted to decide merits issues at these hearings when those issues 
overlapped with the requirements for certification under Rule 23.
12
  This 
disagreement stemmed from seemingly conflicting language in two 
Supreme Court cases: Eisen and Falcon.
13
 
In Eisen, the plaintiffs had filed a class action on behalf of odd-lot 
traders on the New York Stock Exchange, alleging that defendant 
brokerage firms had violated federal antitrust laws.
14
  Prior to certification, 
the plaintiffs requested that defendants be made to share the costs of 
notice.
15
  The district court conducted a hearing on the merits of plaintiffs’ 
antitrust claims, and after determining that the plaintiffs were likely to 
prevail on the merits of those claims, ordered that costs of notice be shifted 
 
 9.  The 23(a) requirements are that:  
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims 
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 10.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  
 11.  Rubenstein, supra note 4, at 12-22. 
 12.  See infra Part II.b. 
 13.  See infra pp. 4-7. 
 14.  Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 160 (1974). 
 15.  Id. at 166-167. 
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to the defendant.
16
 
The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision to shift costs, 
reasoning that the language of Rule 23 precluded the shifting of costs of 
notice.
17
  The Court also condemned the district court’s decision to 
determine the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing on the merits, stating: 
 
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that 
gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into 
the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be 
maintained as a class action . . . . In determining the propriety of a 
class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs 
have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but 
rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.
18
 
 
Citing this language, many courts after Eisen determined that they lacked 
the authority to decide merits issues that overlapped with the requirements 
for certification under Rule 23.
19
 
This interpretation of Eisen was probably wrong.
20
  In explaining why 
the lower court’s merits determination was incorrect, the Eisen Court stated 
that “such a procedure contravenes the Rule by allowing a representative 
plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without first satisfying the 
requirements for it.”
21
  In other words, what upset the Court was not that 
merits had been examined, but that the district court had used a 
determination that plaintiffs were likely to win, by way of a merits 
examination, to disregard the notice requirements of Rule 23.
22
 
The Supreme Court sought to clarify the confusion caused by Eisen 
when it decided Falcon eight years later.  In Falcon, the district court had 
certified a 23(b)(3) class under Title VII where the class representative 
alleged race-based discrimination in promotion, but sought to represent a 
 
 16.  Id. at 168. 
 17.  Id. at 175-77. 
 18.  Id. at 177-178. 
 19.  See David S. Evans, Class Certification, the Merits, and Expert Evidence, 11 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1, 8 (2002) (examining lower courts use of this language to forbid merits 
inquiries). 
 20.  As discussed in Part III.b., infra, the court in Wal-Mart explicitly rejected this 
interpretation of Eisen. 
 21.  Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78. 
 22.  See id. at 178 (describing the district court’s approach as “directly contrary to the 
command of subdivision (c)(1) that the court determine whether a suit denominated a class 
action may be maintained as such as soon as practicable after the commencement of the 
action.” (internal quotations ommited)).  Further support for this interpretation is found from 
the court’s remark that the district court’s examination of the merits was unfair to 
defendants, not plaintiffs.  Id. at 178-179. 
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class of employees who were discriminated against in hiring.
23
  The district 
court had found that Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common questions 
predominate over individual questions was met, because discrimination 
suits “are often by their very nature class suits, involving class-wide 
wrongs,” and “[c]ommon questions of law or fact are typically present.”
24
 
The Supreme Court rejected this approach, holding that courts may 
only certify a class if, “after a rigorous analysis,” they are convinced that 
the requirements of Rule 23 are actually met, not just presumably so.
25
  The 
Court acknowledged that this might sometimes require a court to “probe 
behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question,” 
because the class certification decision “generally involves considerations 
that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s 
cause of action.’”
26
  Thus for the Falcon Court, deciding merits issues when 
they overlap with certification requirements was not just permissible, it was 
required. 
Despite this statement by Falcon, Eisen’s seemingly conflicting 
language produced uncertainty in the lower courts as to the proper scope of 
their inquiry.
27
  The Seventh Circuit, for example, read Falcon to mean that 
courts must not only hear evidence from plaintiffs on overlapping issues, 
but must also weigh competing evidence on those issues from the defense.
28
  
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, held that while overlapping merits 
issues could be considered, competing defense evidence was not to be 
examined.
29
  Citing to Eisen, the Second Circuit reasoned that courts were 
not permitted to “conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in 
order to determine whether [the case] may be maintained as a class 
action.”
30
  As discussed in Part II.b., infra, this confusion has been a 
 
 23.  General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 153-154 (1982). 
 24.  Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 
431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977)). 
 25.  Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161. 
 26.  Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 
469 (1978)).   
 27.  Rubenstein, supra note 4, at 117-126; Evans, supra note 19, at 10.   
 28.  West v. Prudential Sec., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 29.  Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled 
by In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 30.  Caridad, 191 F.3d  at 291.  The Second Circuit later backed off this approach, 
holding in In re IPO Sec. Litig. that a court must consider competing evidence. In re IPO 
Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 27.  Other courts, while acknowledging that consideration of merits 
issues was necessary, admonished against turning the class certification hearing into a mini-
trial on the merits.  See Madison v. Chalmette Refining, LLC, 637 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 
2011) (noting that class certifications should not be “mini-trials” on the merits, while also 
acknowledging that overlapping merits issues must be considered); see also Dukes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 581 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) 
(“[Rigorous analysis] does not mean that a district court must conduct a full-blown trial on 
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substantial contributor to the differing approaches of courts in dealing with 
Daubert objections at the class certification stage. 
II. DAUBERT: ITS REQUIREMENTS AND HOW PRE-WAL-MART AND 
COMCAST COURTS DEALT WITH THOSE REQUIREMENTS. 
In the context of a trial, the Daubert test requires judges to examine 
the reliability of expert testimony and to rule on its admissibility at the 
outset.
31
  Before the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, there was disagreement 
between the circuits on the scope of a judge’s Daubert inquiry at the class 
certification stage.
32
  Some courts held that a full and conclusive Daubert 
analysis was required, while other courts were less exacting, requiring 
general scrutiny but not a conclusive ruling on admissibility.
33
  These 
different approaches stemmed in part from disagreement about the scope of 
the court’s class certification inquiry under Eisen and Falcon.
34
 
A. The Daubert Test 
The Daubert test is an application of Federal Rule of Evidence 
(“FRE”) 702, which governs expert testimony at trial.  Witnesses are 
generally forbidden from testifying as to opinions, and non-expert 
witnesses may only offer opinions when they are tied to the witness’s 
actual observations or helpful in understanding first-hand observations.
35
  
This restrictive approach reflects the pervasive philosophy of the common 
law that first-hand observations are the most reliable source of 
information.
36
  Expert witness testimony, which allows the expert to testify 
in the form of an opinion despite a lack of personal observation,
37
 thus 
 
the merits prior to certification.”). 
 31.  See infra Part II.a. 
 32.  See infra Part II.b. 
 33.  See infra Part II.b. 
 34.  See infra Part II.b. 
 35.  See FED. R. EVID. 701(a)-(b) (“If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony 
in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s 
perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a 
fact in issue.”). 
 36.  See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note to 1972 Proposed Rules (“The 
rule retains the traditional objective of putting the trier of fact in possession of an accurate 
reproduction of the event.”); id. (“[Testimony] rationally based on the witness’s 
perception . . . is the familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation.”); 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (noting that first-hand 
knowledge was deemed to be the most reliable source of information under the common 
law).   
 37.  See FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating the grounds on which an expert may testify); 
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represents a departure from the FRE’s general approach to opinion 
testimony.
38
 
Because expert testimony is a departure from usual notions of 
reliability, the Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. held 
that in order to be admissible, expert testimony must “have a reliable basis 
in the knowledge and experience of [the expert’s] discipline.”
39
  In the 
context of testimony about scientific information, this meant that in order 
to be reliable, the expert’s testimony needed to be “ground[ed] in the 
methods and procedures of science” and derived from the scientific 
method.
40
  The expert him or herself must have sufficient “knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education.”
41
 
The Court also imposed what might initially seem like an 
unremarkable requirement: the expert evidence must be relevant, meaning 
that it “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue.”
42
 A requirement that evidence be relevant seems 
unremarkable, because relevance is a prerequisite to the admission of any 
evidence under the FRE.
43
  However, in the context of expert testimony, 
relevance means it is not enough for the expert to present scientific 
evidence and opine that such evidence is probative of a fact in issue.
44
  
Instead, it must be shown that the expert’s “reasoning or methodology 
properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”
45
  Later courts elaborated that 
not only must the methodology of the expert be reliable, but the 
methodology’s application to the facts must also be reliable.
46
 
 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 (“[A]n expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, 
including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation.”). 
 38.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-592.   
 39.  Id. at 592. Daubert itself dealt with scientific expert evidence, but the court later 
extended its holding to all expert testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 
U.S. 137, 147 (1999). 
 40.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
 41.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 42.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702).   
 43.  FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 44.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (“The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may 
provide valid scientific “knowledge” about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness 
is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact.  However (absent creditable 
grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not 
assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have 
behaved irrationally on that night.”). 
 45.  Id. at 593. 
 46.  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997). The test is flexible, giving 
judges latitude to decide which factors are relevant in determining the reliability of 
testimony in a particular case.  Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 
(1999).  Decisions to admit or exclude expert testimony are reviewed on an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Gen. Elec., 522 U.S. 136. 
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Daubert itself dealt with expert testimony linking ingestion of the 
drug Bendectin to birth defects.  Applying the newly announced Daubert 
test on remand, the Ninth Circuit excluded expert testimony that purported 
to show a causal link between ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy and 
eventual birth defects.
47
  The experts in Daubert testified that Bendectin 
could cause birth defects, because statistics showed that women who 
ingested Bendectin had a higher incidence of birth defects.
48
  The court 
held, however, that mere correlation was not sufficient to show but-for 
causation, and thus was not relevant.
49
  In order to show causation, the 
experts needed to show that Benedictin more than doubled the incidence of 
birth defects in the general population or use statistical techniques to isolate 
other potential causes.
50
  Therefore, even though the expert evidence 
showed Bendectin increased the incidence of birth defects, it was not 
probative of a fact in issue, and therefore not admissible.
51
 
Under Daubert, the judge must determine at the outset whether the 
expert testimony is sufficiently reliable, before the jury hears the 
testimony.
52
  The test thus places the judge in a “gatekeeping” role.
53
  This 
gatekeeping role is justified on the grounds that experts enjoy testimonial 
privileges including the ability to offer opinions not tied to first-hand 
knowledge.
54
  Juries may also be unduly swayed by expert testimony, as 
they will view it as scientific, and thus infallible.
55
  Because Daubert is 
about gatekeeping, many courts have held that it becomes less important in 
bench trials, since there is no jury to protect.
56
  The Seventh Circuit in 
 
 47.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). 
 53.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
 54.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592; Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147. 
 55.  Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s 
Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1102 (2006); Robert J. Goodwin, 
Fifty Years of Frye in Alabama: The Continuing Debate over Adopting the Test Established 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 35 CUMB. L. REV. 231, 247 (2005).  The 
Daubert gatekeeping role has been criticized on several grounds.  Some argue that it 
requires federal judges to become “amateur scientists,” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and question whether judges are actually better at determining 
the reliability of technical evidence than juries; Frank R. Emmerich Jr., Note, The Supreme 
Court Strengthens the Discretionary Powers of the District Courts in Admitting Expert 
Scientific Testimony: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 
1051, 1083 (1994). 
 56.  See In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(“The main purpose of Daubert exclusion is to protect juries from being swayed by dubious 
scientific testimony. That interest is not implicated . . . where the judge is the decision 
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Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, for example, noted that “the usual 
concerns of the rule—keeping unreliable expert testimony from the jury—
are not present in such a setting, and our review must take this factor into 
consideration.”
57
 
B. Daubert at the Certification Stage in the Pre-Wal-Mart Era 
Given the weakening of Daubert when no jury is present, and given 
their interpretation of Eisen as disallowing consideration of the merits at 
the class certification stage, some pre-Wal-Mart courts decided that they 
need not rule conclusively on Daubert objections when deciding whether to 
certify a class, or concluded they need only conduct a limited Daubert 
inquiry.
58
  Other courts, however, held that Daubert objections did need to 
be decided, and some courts went even further, holding that competing 
defense expert testimony must be considered.
59
 
The group that subscribed to a limited Daubert inquiry believed that 
while a court generally must verify the quality of expert testimony, it need 
not, as a general rule, definitively decide Daubert objections.
60
  The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, took the approach that “as a general rule, district 
courts are not required to hold a Daubert hearing before ruling on the 
admissibility of scientific evidence.”
61
 While a court may have needed to 
examine certain elements of an expert’s testimony, particularly the 
 
maker.”); Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 615 F.3d 321, 330 
(5th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he importance of the trial court’s gatekeeper role is significantly 
diminished in bench trials, as in this instance, because, there being no jury, there is no risk 
of tainting the trial by exposing a jury to unreliable evidence”); Attorney Gen. of Oklahoma 
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 779 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he usual concerns regarding 
unreliable expert testimony reaching a jury obviously do not arise when a district court is 
conducting a bench trial.”); United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(“There is less need for the gatekeeper to keep the gate when the gatekeeper is keeping the 
gate only for himself.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
 57.  619 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2010).  Commentators also question whether juries 
actually do give undue weight to expert testimony.  Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman 
Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121 (2001). 
 58.  See infra pp. 9-10 
 59.  See infra p. 11.  Though differences clearly existed between circuits on how 
Daubert should be handled at the class certification stage, it might be too harsh to call these 
differences a “split.”  The circuits that did not require conclusive rulings on Daubert still 
examined the methodology of the expert, and in some cases compared it to competing 
expert testimony from the defense.  See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 605-
08 (9th Cir. 2010) (examining closely the plaintiff expert’s methodology); Blades v. 
Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 569-71 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining to rule definitively on 
Daubert but also considering and weighing competing expert testimony from defense). 
 60.  Rubenstein, supra note 4, §7:24. 
 61.  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 573 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotations omitted).   
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methodology, a court was generally not required to decide whether an 
expert’s testimony was sufficiently probative.
62
  According to the Ninth 
Circuit, the probative value of expert testimony was an issue for the 
ultimate fact finder, and ruling on such unnecessarily involved the court in 
merits determinations in violation of Eisen.
63
 
The Eighth Circuit similarly believed that a full Daubert inquiry was 
not necessary because certification “disputes may be resolved only insofar 
as resolution is necessary to determine the nature of the evidence that 
would be sufficient.”
64
  In Blades v. Monsanto Co., the Eight Circuit upheld 
a district court’s decision not to definitively rule on a Daubert objection to 
expert testimony.
65
  Although the district court did examine the 
methodology of the expert, the court declined to conclusively rule on such 
evidence, reasoning that it was “appropriate for [the court] . . . to consider 
all evidence at this stage of the proceedings.”
66
  This language in Monsanto 
could be taken as an acknowledgement of the reduced importance of the 
gatekeeper role of a court at the class certification hearing given that the 
judge, and not the jury, decides class certification motions.  In other words, 
the court decided it was proper to hear “all evidence” because at the class 
certification hearing, there was no jury to protect.  This language could also 
be taken to mean that a definitive ruling on evidence exclusion was 
improper at class certification because class certification is preliminary, 
and courts should not be making definitive rules if they will overlap with 
the merits.
67
 
In contrast to the Ninth and Eighth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit held 
in American Honda Motor Company v. Allen that when expert testimony is 
critical to class certification, a district court is required to conduct a full 
Daubert analysis and conclusively rule on admissibility.
68
  The district 
court in American Honda had done a partial Daubert analysis, examining 
the witness’s methodology closely, but refusing to exclude the expert 
testimony “at this early stage of the proceedings,” despite doubts about its 
reliability.
69
  Thus, like the court in Monsanto, the district court viewed the 
certification stage as preliminary, or perhaps possessed an Eisen-like 
 
 62.  Id. at 602-03 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Blades, 400 F.3d at 567.  The Second Circuit was also in the limited Daubert group 
until the overruling of Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir. 
1999) by In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).   
 65.  Blades, 400 F.3d at 567.   
 66.  Id. at 569. 
 67.  As discussed in Part III.b., infra, the Eight Circuit confirmed post-Wal-Mart that 
both these considerations were in play. 
 68.  Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010) 
 69.  Allen v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 264 F.R.D. 412, 428 (N.D. Ill. 2009)  
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hesitancy towards merits determinations.
70
 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, saying that “a district court must make 
the necessary factual and legal inquiries and decide all relevant contested 
issues prior to certification” and may not take a “provisional approach.”
71
  
Thus, unlike the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit did not 
view the combination of Eisen and Falcon as mandating a tentative 
approach to overlapping merits issues.  Instead, a “rigorous analysis” meant 
that courts must actually decide overlapping merits issues.
72
  Since these 
overlapping issues were to be actually decided,
73
 the court should use its 
normal tools of procedural protections, including Daubert, to ensure that 
only reliable evidence was used.
74
 
III. WAL-MART AND COMCAST: AFFIRMING FALCON AND ITS 
RIGOROUS ANALYSIS 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, lower courts and rule makers began 
to address concerns about the ability of the structural pressures of class 
certification to compel settlement.
75
 Then in 2011 and 2013, respectively, 
the Court decided Wal-Mart and Comcast, which came firmly down on the 
side of Falcon, explicitly stating that Eisen had been misinterpreted.
76
  The 
combination of these developments has greatly changed the landscape of 
 
 70.  See Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 600 F.3d at 817 (“The district court’s actions here 
were more akin to the provisional approach that we rejected in Szabo.”) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 71.  Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 600 F.3d at 817. 
 72.  See id. at 817 (“A district judge may not duck hard questions by observing that 
each side has some support . . . . Tough questions must be faced and squarely decided.”) 
(internal quotations omitted).   
 73.  The fact that the court decided an overlapping merits issue does not mean a later 
fact finder is bound by the court’s determination of that issue at the certification stage.  In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (2009). 
 74.  See Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 600 F.3d at 817 (“Ezra’s testimony is necessary to 
show that Plaintiffs’ claims are capable of resolution on a class-wide basis and that the 
common defect in the motorcycle predominates over the class members’ individual issues. 
Therefore, by failing to clearly resolve the issue of its admissibility before certifying the 
class, the district court erred.”).  The Third Circuit was a notable exception to this 
generalization in that it dictated a searching review at class certification, but did not require 
a full Daubert analysis.  See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(applying the Third Circuit standard that the certification requirements be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but not requiring a final ruling on a Daubert objection).  It 
might be the case, however, that Behrend was incorrectly decided under the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Hydrogen Peroxide.  See Behrend, 655 F.3d at 214-15 (Jordan, J., dissenting) 
(“[The Expert’s] testimony is irrelevant and should be inadmissible at trial, pursuant to . . . 
Daubert . . . . Thus, it cannot constitute common evidence of damages.”) 
 75.  See infra Part III.a. 
 76.  See infra Part III.b. 
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class certification. 
A. Pre-Wal-Mart and Comcast Developments 
In the decade preceding the Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart and 
Comcast, courts and rule makers increased the procedural protections 
surrounding class certification.  These increases stemmed in part from 
concerns about the ability of certification to force defendants to settle.
77
  As 
noted by the Third Circuit in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 
class certification was generally the whole ball game in class actions,
78
 
because certification “may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the 
costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous 
liability.”
79
 
These concerns led the Federal Rules Committee to amend Rule 23(f) 
in 1998 to allow for permissive interlocutory appeal of class certification 
decisions.  Prior to this amendment, a party seeking to appeal a certification 
decision could generally only do so after going to trial and losing.
80
  Given 
the danger and cost of going to trial, this rarely happened.
81
  Thus the 
district court’s certification decision, though truly pivotal, was effectively 
unappealable.
82
  Interlocutory appeal of certification decisions was 
designed to remedy this harsh outcome.
83
 
The rules committee also amended Rule 23(c)(1)(A) in 2003, which 
dealt with the timing of the certification decision.  The language of the rule 
was changed from requiring certification “as soon as practicable” to “at an 
early practicable time.”
84
  This change was made, according to the rules 
 
 77.  See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(expressing concerns about the settlement pressures caused by certification); In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (“Judge Friendly, who was not given to hyperbole, 
called settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a class action 
‘blackmail settlements.’” (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL 
VIEW 120 (1973)). 
 78.  See In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310 (“[D]enying or granting class 
certification is often the defining moment in class actions.”)  The Hydrogen Peroxide court 
also acknowledged, albeit with less discussion, that class certification was the whole ball 
game for plaintiffs, saying denial generally sounded the “death knell” for plaintiffs.  Id.  
Though not stated, the court in Hydrogen Peroxide was likely referring to so called 
“negative value suits,” where the cost of bringing an individual claim outweighs any 
possible recovery from that claim.   
 79.  In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310 (quoting  FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s note, 1998 Amendments). 
 80.  Rubenstein, supra note 4, §7:41. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note, 2003 Amendments. 
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committee, in order to allow for more time to gather information relevant to 
the certification decision through discovery.
85
  In the same package of 
amendments, Rule 23(c)(1)(C) was amended to remove language asserting 
that class certification was conditional.
86
  Looked at together, these 
amendments give rise to a clear implication: certification is not a tentative 
preliminary ruling based on limited facts—it is a critical outcome 
determinative decision that requires close scrutiny.
87
 
Around the time of these amendments, courts began to clarify or raise 
the standard for certification in acknowledgement of the concerns about 
settlement pressure, and perhaps belatedly in recognition of the fallacy of a 
conflict between Eisen and Falcon.  In 2006, the Second Circuit, which had 
been one of the more merits-adverse circuits, reversed course in IPO 
Securities Litigation, holding that it was no longer enough for a court to 
certify a class on “some showing” that Rule 23’s requirements are met.
88
  
Instead, the court must make a “ruling” or “determination” that the 
requirements of Rule 23 are met by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
89
  
In 2008, the Third Circuit similarly held in Hydrogen Peroxide that factual 
determinations necessary for determination of Rule 23, even those that 
overlapped with the merits, must be shown by a “preponderance of the 
evidence.”
90
  This meant that a court “must find that the evidence more 
likely than not establishes each fact necessary to meet the requirements of 
Rule 23.”
91
 
 
 85.  See id. (“Time may be needed to gather information necessary to make the 
certification decision.”) 
 86.  Id.  Prior to this amendment, courts had been certifying classes on the condition 
that Rule 23’s provisions be met at some point before trial.  In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 
F.3d at 319-20.  This amendment eliminated this possibility, requiring courts to ensure the 
requirements of Rule 23 were met before certification.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory 
committee’s note, 2003 Amendments (“A court that is not satisfied that the requirements of 
Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met.”). 
 87.  See In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 39 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that that the 2003 
amendments “arguably combine to permit a more extensive inquiry into whether Rule 23 
requirements are met than was previously appropriate”); In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 
at 320 (“While these amendments do not alter the substantive standards for class 
certification, they guide the trial court in its proper task-to consider carefully all relevant 
evidence and make a definitive determination that the requirements of Rule 23 have been 
met before certifying a class.”). 
 88.  In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 40. 
 89.  Id. at 37, 40.  Although IPO mentioned the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, it was not clear that the court had adopted this standard until the court in 
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension. Fund v. Bombardier Inc. confirmed that it had.  
546 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2008).  The Second Circuit analogized to a ruling on jurisdiction, 
which would require the court to make rulings on factual and legal issues.  In re IPO Sec. 
Litig., 471 F.3d at 40. 
 90.  Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320.   
 91.  Id.   
MESSER_FINAL (ARTICLE 6).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  5:51 PM 
306 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
B. Wal-Mart 
In Wal-Mart, the Court considered the certification of a nationwide 
23(b)(2) injunctive class composed of female Wal-Mart employees that 
alleged sex-based discrimination in pay and promotion in violation of Title 
VII.
92
  Plaintiffs alleged that while Wal-Mart’s official employment 
policies forbid discrimination, its decentralized system of decisionmaking, 
where local managers made decisions on promotion and pay, had the effect 
of discriminating against women.
93
  Plaintiffs also alleged that Wal-Mart 
had a strong corporate culture that permitted bias against women and that 
this culture infected the decisions of local managers.
94
 
In order to prove their allegations, plaintiffs presented expert 
testimony from a sociology professor.
95
  The expert used a social 
framework analysis to show that Wal-Mart had a strong corporate culture 
that made it vulnerable to gender bias.
96
  The defendants had disputed in the 
district court whether the expert’s testimony was admissible under Daubert 
standards, but the district court had declined to rule conclusively on this 
issue, thinking such a ruling unnecessary at the class certification stage.
97
 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s certification of the 
class, holding that the requirement of commonality under 23(a) had not 
been met.
98
  The Court noted that there was significant overlap in this case 
between 23(a) commonality and Title VII’s pattern or practice 
discrimination.
99
  The fact that the court would thus have to decide a merits 
issue in order to determine a certification issue gave the Court no pause.  
Citing Falcon, the Court asserted that a court must engage in a “rigorous 
analysis” when deciding if Rule 23’s requirements are met.
100
  This is so 
even if merits issues overlap.
101
  Such overlap “cannot be helped.”
102
  In a 
footnote, the Court expressly rejected the idea that Eisen forbid merits 
inquiries, saying that Eisen merely rejected looking at the merits in order to 
circumvent Rule 23’s notice requirements.
103
  The Court did not set forth a 
standard of proof for determining if Rule 23’s requirements were met, such 
 
 92.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011). 
 93.  Id. at 2548. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 2553; Faculty Profile of William Bielby, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT 
CHICAGO, http://soc.uic.edu/sociology/people/faculty/wbielby (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
 96.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.  
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 2556-57. 
 99.  Id. at 2552. 
 100.  Id. at 2551. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 2552 n.6. 
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as the “preponderance of the evidence” proposed by the Second and Third 
Circuits.  The Court did note, however, that Rule 23’s requirements must 
be met “in fact,”
104
 and that plaintiffs “must affirmatively demonstrate 
[their] compliance”
105
 with “significant proof.”
106
 
Regarding the lower court’s assertion that the Daubert inquiry was not 
required at the certification stage, the Court said in dictum, “[w]e doubt 
that is so,” but did not actually decide the issue.
107
  The Court then went on 
to examine closely the probative value of the expert’s testimony, ultimately 
finding that the testimony failed to prove a practice or procedure of 
discrimination for purposes of Title VII and for commonality under Rule 
23(a).
108
  The problem for the Court was that the expert’s theory asserted 
that corporate culture caused discrimination through stereotyped thinking, 
but the expert could not determine what percentage of pay and promotion 
decisions were actually caused by such thinking.
109
  The testimony thus was 
not probative of a fact at issue.
110
 
C. Comcast 
In Comcast, decided two years after Wal-Mart, the district court had 
certified a 23(b)(3) consumer class action against Comcast, a cable 
television provider.
111
  Plaintiffs alleged that Comcast had violated federal 
antitrust laws by attempting to monopolize the Philadelphia television 
market.
112
  In order to meet their burden under 23(b)(3) to establish that 
common questions predominated over individual ones, the plaintiffs sought 
to show that damages were capable of common proof through the expert 
testimony of an economist.
113
  The defendants had challenged the 
 
 104.  Id. at 2551 (emphasis in original). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 2553 (quoting General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982)).  The 
court also cited Falcon for the proposition that actual, not presumed, compliance with Rule 
23 is required.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (citing Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161). 
 107.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 2254. 
 110.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2254 (stating that the expert testimony “d[id] nothing to 
advance respondents’ case.”). 
 111.  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1429-30 (2013). 
 112.  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430. 
 113.  Id.  As the dissent in Comcast points out, it is highly questionable that the plaintiff 
actually needed to show commonality of damages.  See id. at 1437 (Ginsberg, J., & Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (“Recognition that individual damages calculations do not preclude class 
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal.”).  The Court noted, however, that 
respondent plaintiffs had not challenged that assertion at the certiorari stage.  See id. at 1430 
(“The District Court held, and it is uncontested here, that to meet the predominance 
requirement respondents had to show . . . that the damages resulting from [the] injury were 
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methodology of this expert, both directly and through competing expert 
testimony. The Third Circuit, however, citing to Eisen, ruled that such 
challenges were “attacks on the merits of the methodology that have no 
place in the class certification inquiry.”
114
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether a court 
must rule on Daubert objections.
115
  The Court declined to decide the 
Daubert issue, however, because defendants had not properly raised it 
below.
116
  Nonetheless, as in Wal-Mart, the Court decided it had the duty to 
scrutinize the expert’s testimony, because the failure to object to Daubert 
admissibility does not preclude examination of whether Rule 23’s 
requirements were met by that testimony.
117
 
In reversing, the Court held that the Third Circuit’s treatment of the 
defense’s attacks on the methodology of the expert directly contradicted the 
Court’s statement in Wal-Mart that courts must conduct a rigorous analysis, 
even if it entailed overlapping merits issues.
118
  The Court rejected the 
Third Circuit’s assertion that it need not determine whether the 
methodology of the expert was a “just and reasonable inference or 
speculative,” reasoning that under such a rule, “any method of 
measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied class-wide, no 
matter how arbitrary the measurements may be.”
119
  In other words, just 
because an expert’s model says it shows class-wide damages, does not 
mean Rule 23 has been satisfied.  Instead, the model must actually show 
class-wide damages based on a reliable methodology.
120
 
 
measurable ‘on a class-wide basis’ through use of a ‘common methodology.’” (quoting 
Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 154 (E.D. Pa. 2010)). 
 114.  Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1426 
(2013).  The Third Circuit reasoned that defendants’ challenges were merits inquiries 
because the challenges would only change the amount of damages, not the district court’s 
holding that damages were capable of proof on a common basis.  Behrend, 655 F.3d  at 207. 
 115.  See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1431 n.4 (“Whether a district court may certify a class 
action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, 
including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a 
class-wide basis.”). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 1432 n.4 (“Such a forfeit would make it impossible for petitioners to argue 
that Dr. McClave’s testimony was not ‘admissible evidence’ under the Rules; but it does not 
make it impossible for them to argue that the evidence failed to show that the case is 
susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 118.  Id. at 1432-33. 
 119.  Id. at 1433 (quoting Behrend, 655 F.3d at 206). 
 120.  See id. (“[I]t is clear that, under the proper standard for evaluating certification, 
respondents’ model falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement 
on a classwide basis. Without presenting another methodology, respondents cannot show 
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance”).  The Court’s reasoning seems to reflect concerns by other 
commentators, that uncritical acceptance of expert reports at the certification stage “han[ds] 
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The Court then went on to reject the probative value of the expert’s 
report.  The expert had used a statistical regression model to show what 
prices would have been but-for Comcast’s anticompetitive behavior.
121
  The 
difference between this model’s calculations and actual prices was 
purported to be the damages from the anticompetitive behavior.
122
  The 
problem with this model, according to the Court, was that the plaintiffs had 
originally alleged four theories of antitrust impact from which damages 
could flow, but the court below rejected all but one.
123
  The expert’s model 
failed to isolate damages from the one remaining theory.
124
  Thus, it could 
not be shown that the damages alleged were actually from the one 
remaining theory, and not another rejected theory.
125
  Therefore, because 
the expert’s model failed to show that damages were capable of proof on a 
class-wide basis, the class was improperly certified.
126
 
 
D. How Daubert has been Handled by Courts Post-Wal-Mart and 
Comcast 
After Wal-Mart and Comcast, courts continued to diverge on the issue 
of Daubert at class certification.  The Eighth Circuit in In re Zurn Pex 
Plumbing Products Liability Litigation affirmed its pre-Wal-Mart stance 
that a full and conclusive Daubert ruling was not necessary at the class 
certification stage.
127
  It reasoned that certification is inherently tentative 
and that the judge’s Daubert gatekeeper role is not as important at class 
certification where there is no jury.
128
  The Seventh Circuit, however, in 
Messner v. Northshore University Health System concluded that the district 
court must make a conclusive ruling on any challenges to an expert’s 
testimony.
129
 
 
off to experts” the “decision as to whether the elements are susceptible to common proof.” 
Kermit Roosevelt III, Defeating Class Certification in Securities Fraud Actions, 22 REV. 
LITIG. 405, 425 (2003).  This quote was used by the Comcast petitioners in their brief to the 
court.  Brief for Petitioners at 41, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426. 
 121.  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id.   
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 1434, citing Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Jordan, J. dissenting). 
 126.  Id. at 1433. 
 127.  In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 614 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 128.  Id. at 613. 
 129.  Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2012). 
MESSER_FINAL (ARTICLE 6).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  5:51 PM 
310 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
IV. THE IMPACT OF WAL-MART AND COMCAST 
Although courts have continued to diverge somewhat on the issue of 
Daubert at class certification, the Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart and 
Comcast probably settle the issue in favor of those circuits requiring a full 
and conclusive Daubert ruling.  These decisions, in conjunction with 
developments before those decisions were handed down, have undermined 
many of the arguments advanced against a conclusive Daubert ruling and 
leave little room for the limited Daubert analysis that some courts have 
engaged in. 
A. The Falcon Supremacy 
After Wal-Mart and Comcast, there is no doubt that courts must 
consider merits issues that overlap with the requirements for certification.  
Citing to Falcon, Wal-Mart explicitly rejected the interpretation of Eisen 
that said courts cannot look at merits issues, saying that Eisen was about 
not circumventing Rule 23’s requirements via a merits examination.
130
  
Comcast affirmed this understanding.
131
  Wal-Mart also did not suggest that 
courts must walk on eggshells when considering overlapping merits issues.  
Instead, it remarked that such overlap “[could not] be helped” and that a 
court’s consideration of certification requirements must nonetheless be 
“rigorous.”
132
 
This interpretation of Eisen eliminates one of the major objections to 
Daubert at class certification.  As mentioned in Part III.b., supra, confusion 
about Eisen’s meaning was a major source of disagreement about whether 
Daubert objections had to be decided.  Courts that rejected the idea that a 
conclusive and full Daubert analysis must be made often cited to Eisen’s 
prohibition against merits inquiries.
133
  These courts reasoned that to rule 
on Daubert was to rule on merits issues like the probative value of the 
expert’s testimony.
134
  With the mistaken Eisen interpretation out of the 
way, this concern should no longer apply. 
Comcast’s treatment of expert testimony demonstrates this result.  In 
 
 130.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011). 
 131.  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432-33 (“By refusing to entertain arguments against 
respondents’ damages model that bore on the propriety of class certification, simply because 
those arguments would also be pertinent to the merits determination, the Court of Appeals 
ran afoul of our precedents requiring precisely that inquiry.”). 
 132.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 133.  See supra Part III.b (discussing the overlap between Rule 23 commonality and the 
merits of a case for certifying plaintiff classes). 
 134.  See supra Part II.b (discussing the need to rule on Daubert objections at the 
certification stage). 
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Comcast, the Court closely scrutinized the methodology of the expert’s 
statistical model in a Daubert-like manner, asking not only whether it 
purported to prove damages on a common basis, but also whether it 
actually did so through good inferences and assumptions.
135
  The Third 
Circuit had considered such an inquiry an improper consideration of the 
merits.
136
  The Court explicitly rejected this argument, saying courts were 
required to test the methodology of experts, even without a Daubert 
objection to such testimony.
137
 
The Court’s recent opinion in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement 
Plans & Trust Funds does not affect this reasoning.  In Amgen, the Court 
upheld the certification of a 23(b)(3) securities class action where plaintiffs 
sought to meet 23(b)(3)’s requirement of predominance through a fraud-on-
market presumption, but had not yet shown materiality.
138
  The Court held, 
however, that materiality did not need to be proven at the class certification 
stage because determination of materiality was capable of resolution on a 
class-wide basis.
139
  The Court also noted that merits issues may be 
“considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to 
determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are 
satisfied.”
140
  This language does not reverse Wal-Mart’s rejection of the 
erroneous Eisen interpretation, and instead clarifies that 23(b)(3) 
predominance can be met if an element of the cause of action will either 
succeed or fail on a class-wide basis, even if that key issue is a prerequisite 
to making other issues provable on a class-wide basis.
141
 
B. Tentative No More 
Pre-Wal-Mart developments, as well as Wal-Mart itself and Comcast, 
have significantly reduced the extent to which a class certification is 
considered tentative, and thus have eliminated another major objection to 
 
 135.  Supra Part III.c.  
 136.  Supra Part III.c. 
 137.  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431 n.4. (2013). 
 138.  Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1190-91 (2013).  
Materiality is a prerequisite to the fraud-on-the-market presumption, but it is not a 
prerequisite to class certification. Id. at 1202. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 1195 (emphasis added). 
 141.  Id. at 1196 (“[T]he failure of proof on the element of materiality would end the 
case for one and for all; no claim would remain in which individual reliance issues could 
potentially predominate.”)  See Oral Argument at 15:15-25, Haliburton Co, v. Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc., __S. Ct. ___ (2014) (Kagan, J.) (“[Amgen] said . . . when you rule on a question 
like materiality, which  leaves all members of the class in the exact same  position, either 
with a viable claim or with no claim, and it doesn’t split the class in the way that the 
efficient markets theory do, that’s the difference.”) 
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full Daubert at certification.  The idea that class certification is tentative, 
and thus that a conclusive ruling on Daubert is inappropriate, comes from a 
footnote in the Court’s opinion in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, where 
the Court said that certification is “inherently tentative.”
142
  The issue in 
Coopers was whether a class certification decision was a “final decision,” 
and thus appealable as of right.
143
  In holding it was not, the court cited to 
the version of Rule 23(c)(1) in existence at the time, which said that 
certification orders could be modified prior to trial.
144
 
Much has changed since Coopers. As mentioned in Part III.a., supra, 
serious concerns about the settlement pressures that flow from a certified 
class led rule makers to enact changes to Rule 23.  First, interlocutory 
appeal, whose unavailability made the Court’s holding in Coopers 
necessary, is now available via Rule 23(f).  Second, the rule cited to by 
Coopers for the proposition that certification is tentative, Rule 23(c)(1), has 
been changed such that conditional certification is no longer available.
145
  
Third, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) was amended to allow for more flexibility in the 
timing of the class certification, with the idea being that certification was 
an important decision that needed to be made with sufficient information.
146
 
Wal-Mart and Comcast also undermine notions of tentativeness.  Both 
these cases engage in lengthy discussion about the scope of a court’s 
review in certifying a class and scrutinize expert witness testimony used in 
certification.
147
  The word “tentative,” however, appears nowhere in either 
case.
148
  The Court also uses strong language in those cases inconsistent 
with a tentative approach.  To say that something is tentative is to say it is 
“uncertain” or “not fully worked out.”
149
  This understanding is hard to 
reconcile with Wal-Mart’s statement that plaintiffs must “affirmatively 
demonstrate . . . compliance with the Rule,” showing they are “in fact” 
satisfied.
150
 
 
 142.  Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11 (1978). 
 143.  Id. at 464-65. 
 144.  Id. at 465. 
 145.  See supra Part III.a.  Although the Coopers court did not cite this portion of 
23(c)(1), the elimination of conditional certification nonetheless weakens this provision 
generally as support for the tentative nature of certification by requiring that certification, 
and thus the provisions of Rule 23, be conclusively decided. 
 146.  See supra Part III.a. 
 147.  See supra Part Part III.b-c. 
 148.  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).   
 149.  Tentative Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/tentative (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
 150.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (emphasis in original).  The court also quoted Falcon, 
writing that “[a]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains . . . 
indispensable.”  Id. (citing General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)). 
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The non-tentative nature of certification also undermines the argument 
that Daubert at certification is improper, because merits discovery has not 
yet been completed at certification.  The court in In re Zurn put forward 
this argument, reasoning that certification happens at a time when full 
merits discovery has not been completed, but Daubert analysis is often 
incomplete without the information that full merits discovery provides.
151
  
A Daubert ruling would thus be premature.
152
 
As noted above, however, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) was expressly amended so 
as to allow more information gathering before the certification hearing.
153
  
The committee notes also point out that it is very difficult to distinguish 
between merits and certification discovery in the first place.
154
  Thus, in 
light of these amendments and the non-tentative nature of certification 
generally, the solution in In re Zurn should not have been to relax the 
Daubert analysis, but to fulfill the purpose of the 23(c)(1)(A) amendment 
by allowing for full merits discovery. 
The fact that certification is less tentative also strengthens the case for 
full Daubert inquiry by way of analogy to summary judgment.  When 
considering a summary judgment motion, which finally decides issues in 
the case, a court may only consider admissible evidence.
155
  Parties arguing 
for full Daubert inquiry have thus argued that because the certification 
decision effectually decides issues, that decision must also be made on only 
admissible evidence; i.e., Daubert-worthy evidence.
156
  Objectors have 
countered, however, that summary judgment is inapposite, because unlike 
summary judgment, class certification is tentative.
157
  Thus, if certification 
is not really tentative, then the analogy to summary judgment is a much 
more persuasive one. 
C. Standard of Conduct: Rigorous Analysis 
The idea that courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” provides 
support for the idea that courts must conclusively decide Daubert 
 
 151.  See In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liability, 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that “[defendant]’s desire for an exhaustive and conclusive Daubert inquiry before 
the completion of merits discovery cannot be reconciled with the inherently preliminary 
nature of pretrial evidentiary and class certification rulings”).  For example, in In re Zurn, 
the court had bifurcated discovery between discovery necessary for merits determinations 
and discovery necessary for certification.  Id. at 609. 
 152.  Id. at 613. 
 153.  See supra Part III.a. 
 154.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note, 2003 Amendments. 
 155.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 156.  In re Zurn, 644 F.3d at 613. 
 157.  Id. 
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objections, when viewed in context of the strong language in Wal-Mart and 
Comcast and that language’s application in those cases.  Wal-Mart and 
Comcast both emphasized Falcon’s requirement that courts conduct a 
“rigorous analysis,” including a rigorous analysis of expert testimony.
158
  
Comcast also espoused the similar requirement of a “close look.”
159
  These 
requirements are not standards of decision as was Hydrogen Peroxide’s 
requirement that issues be proven “by a preponderance of the evidence.”
160
  
Instead, they are standards of conduct, telling the court to take more than a 
passing look at the certification requirements.  Because they are standards 
of conduct, the issue for purposes of Daubert objections is whether a court 
must conclusively rule on Daubert objections in order for its analysis to be 
sufficiently rigorous. 
Language in Wal-Mart and Comcast provides support for the idea that 
a rigorous analysis must include a conclusive Daubert ruling.  As 
mentioned in Part IV.b., supra, Wal-Mart and Comcast remarked that the 
requirements of Rule 23 must be met “in fact” through an affirmative 
demonstration by the plaintiff.  Wal-Mart also remarked that the plaintiff 
needed to put on “significant proof,”
161
 and Comcast went a step further, 
requiring “evidentiary proof.”
162
  These statements can be combined into 
the following rule: A party must show that the requirements of Rules 23 are 
met, in fact, through significant evidentiary proof.  Given that under this 
rule a party must use “significant evidentiary proof,” it is hard to see how a 
court’s approach was “rigorous,” if it considered information that was not 
sufficiently reliable to be admissible evidence.  As Judge Jordan noted in 
his partial dissent in Comcast below, “[a] court should be hard pressed to 
conclude that the elements of a claim are capable of proof through evidence 
common to a class if the only evidence proffered would not be admissible 
as proof of anything.”
163
 
The Court’s application of a “rigorous analysis” in Wal-Mart and 
Comcast to expert testimony outside of Daubert also supports the case for a 
conclusive Daubert ruling.  In Wal-Mart, the Court discounted significantly 
the probative value of the expert sociologist’s testimony, because his theory 
of a pervasive corporate culture could not help determine how individual 
employment decisions were made.
164
  In Comcast, the Court waded deep 
into the details of the methodology behind the expert’s statistical model and 
 
 158.  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
 159.  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432. 
 160.  Rubenstein, supra note 4,  §7:21. 
 161.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553. 
 162.  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432. 
 163.  Behrend v. Comcast, 655 F.3d 182, 215 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
 164.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553-54. 
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held that the model failed to show what it purported to show.
165
  The Court 
waded so deep that the dissent accused the majority of second-guessing the 
district court’s factual findings.
166
 
These actions by the Courts in Wal-Mart and Comcast, while 
technically done outside of Daubert, look very much like Daubert 
inquiries.  Comcast’s scrutiny of the plaintiff’s expert testimony, for 
example, closely resembles the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the plaintiff’s 
expert testimony on remand in Daubert itself.  There, as in Comcast, the 
Court rejected expert testimony on the grounds that even though the 
expert’s statistics were properly calculated, those statistics were not 
probative of a fact in issue because they had failed to isolate other potential 
causes.
167
  Similarly in Wal-Mart, the Court did not criticize the expert’s 
use of social framework analysis generally, but held that it lacked probative 
value without the ability to isolate other reasons for an employment 
decision.
168
  The fact that the Court would engage in these Daubert-like 
analyses as part of its rigorous analysis, even though Daubert was not 
challenged, suggests that the full Daubert inquiry is required for a 
certification decision to be sufficiently rigorous. 
D. Twiqbal 
The procedural philosophy of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, known collectively as Twiqbal, also supports the 
argument for full Daubert at certification.  In Twombly, plaintiffs alleged 
violations of federal antitrust laws by regional telephone companies.
169
  The 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 
claim under Rule 12(b)(6), saying that plaintiffs had failed to plead facts 
that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
170
  This formulation 
of the pleading standard overruled the lower standard of Conley v. 
 
 165.  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433-35. 
 166.  See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1440 (“[T]he District Court found McClave’s 
econometric model capable of measuring damages on a classwide basis, even after striking 
three of the injury theories. Contrary to the Court’s characterization, this was not a legal 
conclusion about what the model proved; it was a factual finding about how the model 
worked. Under our typical practice, we should leave that finding alone.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 167.  See supra Part I.a. 
 168.  See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (“Bielby’s testimony does nothing to advance 
respondents’ case. [W]hether 0.5 percent or 95 percent of the employment decisions at Wal–
Mart might be determined by stereotyped thinking is the essential question on which 
respondents’ theory of commonality depends. If Bielby admittedly has no answer to that 
question, we can safely disregard what he has to say.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 169.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549-50 (2007). 
 170.  Id. at 555. 
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Gibson.
171
  The Court reasoned that discovery in a class action antitrust 
case would be expensive, and thus “a district court must . . . insist upon 
some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual 
controversy to proceed.”
172
  The Court was unpersuaded by other methods 
of weeding out unmeritorious cases such as judicial case management and 
summary judgment, because “the threat of discovery expense will push 
cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those 
proceedings.”
173
  The Court took a similar approach in Iqbal, where the 
Court again raised the pleading standard where proceeding with the 
litigation would have been burdensome.
174
 
These concerns about non-meritorious claims in Twiqbal are similar to 
those in class actions.  As mentioned in Part III.a., supra, concerns about 
the structural pressures created by class certification were a concern to 
courts and rule makers.  Regardless of the strength of the claims in a class 
action, the act of certification “may force a defendant to settle rather than 
incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially 
ruinous liability.”
175
  Thus, because the structural concerns of class 
certification are similar to those of Twiqbal, it stands to reason that the 
Court would seek a solution similar to that found in Twiqbal. 
Daubert is a solution similar in approach to Twiqbal’s heightened 
pleading standards.  Twiqbal distrusts the ability of judges to weed out bad 
cases through judicial management.  Instead, it prefers a formal legal rule 
of exclusion: plaintiffs must plead more specifically, and if they do not, 
courts must exclude those claims.  Similarly, Daubert distrusts the ability 
of judges to informally consider evidence, and proposes a formal legal rule 
of exclusion: expert testimony must be sufficiently reliable, and if it is not, 
courts must exclude that testimony.
176
  The Twiqbal philosophy also 
counters arguments that the full Daubert inquiry is not necessary, because 
 
 171.  Conley had only required that plaintiff’s pleading “give the defendant fair notice of 
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 
47 (1957). 
 172.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983)). 
 173.  Id. at 559. 
 174.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (2009) (stating that a claim must be “plausible 
on its face”).  In Iqbal, proceeding would have required investigation into the propriety of 
actions by the Attorney General during a time of war.  See id. at 662 (detailing allegations of 
discrimination by then Attorney General John Ashcroft). 
 175.  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting  FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, 1998 Amendments). 
 176.  Admittedly, the analogy to Twiqbal is weakened by the fact that the remedy for an 
insufficient pleading is often amendment, and not dismissal.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) 
(stating that leave to amend should be freely given). 
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there is no jury to protect at class certification.
177
  The Court in Twiqbal 
rejected the idea that judges did not need exclusionary pleading rules 
because they could manage cases; the Court did not believe judges could be 
their own gatekeepers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s jurisprudence on class certification will likely continue to 
evolve.  Many important issues remain to be decided, including, most 
notably, by what level of proof a plaintiff must show Rule 23’s 
requirements are met.
178
  It is not perfectly clear which way the Court will 
come out on this and other issues, but given the Court’s decisions in Wal-
Mart and Comcast, it is reasonably certain that a full and conclusive 
Daubert analysis is now required at the class certification hearing. 
  
 
 177.  See supra Part III.d. 
 178.  Rubenstein, supra note 4, § 7:21. 
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